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INTRODUCTION
Whilst lucid dreaming (LD) is defined as being aware of dreaming whilst dreaming, a
misconception exists in the public domain as a referral to controlling dream content and plot
(Neuhäusler et al., 2018). This misconception reflects a number of widely-held beliefs about the
nature of dreaming, which in part this commentary will seek to explain and rectify.
Furthermore, the aim of this piece is to suggest definitions of key concepts in the study of lucid
and non-lucid dreaming concerning control, cognition, and consciousness. Whilst superficially
there seems overlap between each of these, independent processes, and associated experiences
underpin them.
Dreaming
First it is necessary to identify the parameters of “dreaming.” Essentially dreaming refers to the
recollection of mental content from sleep. This broad definition recognizes that dreams may
be fragmented, brief, non-narrative, thought-like, and/or containing basic sensory-perceptual
experiences such as emotions, without necessarily comprising complex plots or activity. It also
emphasizes the role of memory in accessing experiences, as there are no valid means by which
dreams can be sampled, as neither can individuals report on their activity during sleep nor can we
independently validate individuals’ experiences. Some scholars use “REM” (rapid eye-movement)
sleep and “dreaming” synonymously (e.g., Walker, 2009), recognizing that the majority of
spontaneously recalled dream reports emerge fromREM sleep, and indeed that REM sleep provides
the conditions most typical of dreams, such as bizarreness, clearer dream recall, emotionality and,
likely, hyperassociativity (Horton and Malinowski, 2015; Malinowski and Horton, 2015; Horton,
2017), in which several distinct memory sources and images can be simultaneously experienced.
However, dreams can be sampled easily from non-REM periods, and REM can exist without
dreaming (Solms, 2000), thus is it essential to define the parameters of dreaming relevant to
each scientific investigation. For instance, if we are interested in cognition and/or consciousness
across different periods of sleep, or even across sleep and wake, then the term “mental content”
or “mentation” may be more appropriate than “dream,” to aid such comparability (Kahan and
LaBerge, 2011). If we are interested in characteristics such as emotional intensity or report length,
then we need to clarify whether we should focus upon memory recall from sleep or the underlying
features of a conscious state such as neurological correlates of such activity.
Next, for explorations LD, or even mere lucidity, researchers need to define and operationalise
LD. An awareness of dreaming during dreaming relies on accurate reality monitoring processes
(Johnson et al., 1984) as well as unbiased recall. Reality monitoring is typically impaired during
sleep, hence making experiences of lucidity rare and interesting. However, in order to engage
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the frontal faculties sufficiently to warrant accurate reality
monitoring, an atypical neurological profile is engaged (Voss
et al., 2014). It is therefore important to note that lucidity is
infrequent and abnormal (Vallat et al., 2018), and as such likely
does not reflect “normal” cognition and consciousness during
sleep, particularly when extensive training is necessary in order
to create pre-requisite conditions for lucidity to emerge (e.g.,
Baird et al., 2019). Nevertheless, LD can be reliably measured,
in laboratory conditions, by asking trained participants to move
their eyes systematically whilst lucid (Mota-Rolim, 2020), and it
is recognized that LD may provide insights into the nature of
consciousness (Baird et al., 2019), albeit in a more artificial than
naturally-occurring environment.
The Elements of Cognition vs.
Consciousness
As lucidity during sleep relies on heightened metacognitive
activity, we need to understand what is meant by cognition
during sleep and during wake. Cognition refers to the capacities
and capabilities of function, in this case during sleep, in particular
the organization, activation and reactivation of memories or
experiences that are either familiar or unfamiliar to the dreamer.
These processing capacities are notoriously difficult to study at
any time, during sleep or wake, as some are so speedy they are
automatic and operate beyond conscious awareness (see also the
use of the term “offline processing” insofar as describing non-
conscious cognitive activity, e.g., Wamsley, 2014). Consequently,
it can be apparently tangible for researchers to focus upon
the neural correlates of such behavior, to provide evidence
for their functional existence (Baird et al., 2019). However,
cognitive scientists need to offer theory for the function of such
processes, for instance in relation to sleep-dependent memory
consolidation (Payne and Nadel, 2004), rather than merely
studying activations without considering functional relevance.
In dream science, memory activations and predictable patterns
of dreaming of familiar aspects of waking life have largely
been explored under the Continuity Hypothesis (Schredl and
Hofmann, 2003), as well as being observed in relation to other
behaviors, such as personality traits (Schredl and Erlacher, 2004),
moods, or subsequent performance on cognitive tasks such as
problem solving, insight, creativity (Cai et al., 2009; Lewis et al.,
2018), composition or recall (Baylor and Cavallero, 2001). Studies
of cognition and metacognition during sleep have found that
dreaming is not deficient but rather different in only a few ways
to waking cognition (Kahan and LaBerge, 2011), with reality
monitoring being one of the key different features. Specifically,
during most sleep experiences, people cannot determine that
their mental experience is internally- rather than externally-
generated, consequently dreams feel real. Only in the cases of
LD are individuals aware that they are dreaming. However, often
the heightened metacognitive awareness is rousing and awakens
the dreamer.
Whilst being aware of an experience as being internally-
or externally-oriented can be operationalised in cognitive, or
metacognitive terms, the conscious experience of that function
may be characterized somewhat differently, although some
features may overlap with those of cognition. Consciousness
may, here, refer to the more characteristic features of sleep
mentation, including experiential elements such as the fluidity,
continuity over time, presence of specific features or characters
and the more holistic nature of mental content. For instance,
we may note that non-REM mentation is typically thought-
like and brief, containing day residues and life-like references,
whereas REM sampled mentation is typically bizarre, story-like
and full of activity (Baylor and Cavallero, 2001; Blagrove et al.,
2011). These descriptions of sleep mentation could well-reflect
underlying cognitive processes such as memory activation, likely
forming memory consolidation processes, but the overriding
consciousness is more descriptive. The cognitive interests relate
to function, andmay bemeasures in those terms, such as extent of
activation, whichmay also include aspects that are non-conscious
at the point of experience.
When considering lucidity, the nature of the consciousness
may include sensations of awe at realizing one is dreaming, as
well as vivid memories of the dream experience itself. This is
commonly associated with increased underlying neurocognitive
activity. The underlying cognition, or hypothetical function,
reflects accurate reality monitoring, metacognition, self-
awareness and, typically, arousal (from enjoyment of
the experience).
Furthermore, in some studies of LD, participants who achieve
lucidity may continue to develop the ability to control their
actions during dreaming (LaBerge, 1980). Indeed, several studies
aimed to achieve this, rather than studying the mere presence
of lucidity in more naturalistic or opportunistic settings. Such
studies confuse the concepts of lucidity and control, with the
former being more likely to occur naturally, and the latter
being rare and artificial experiences. As such scholars should
be cautious about inferring the nature of consciousness and/or
cognition from artificial control-induction techniques, as this
likely differs from the profile of mental content emerging from
experiences of lucidity.
LD is unusual, relative to the existence of dreaming which,
arguably, occurs the entire time that one is asleep (if the present
definition of dreaming is adopted, as consciousness continues,
even during sleep). Whilst lucid, or controlled, experiences may
offer a therapeutic benefit, for instance by allowing individuals
to rehearse actions (Stumbrys et al., 2016) or overcome threats
(Putois et al., 2019) during sleep, they are typically fleeting,
and estimations of their frequency often rely on self-report and
retrospectivemethods (Vallat et al., 2018). Furthermore, inducing
lucidity interrupts sleep, which we know is required to facilitate
emotion-regulation and memory consolidation processes, which
arguably would be more beneficial than any benefits of lucid
dreaming anyway (Vallat and Ruby, 2019).
Control
To operationalise lucidity, researchers should take care not to
confuse controlling the dream experience withmere awareness of
dreaming.We should then define control carefully for instance as
voluntarily changing experience. Superficially control may seem
to rely upon both a specific cognitive and consciousness profile,
however the conscious awareness of control may only become
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 July 2020 | Volume 14 | Article 259
Horton Dream Cognition, Consciousness and Control
apparent at the time of recall, rather than during the experience
itself, and again scholars should take care to identify any potential
additional explanatory information offered to a dream report at
the point of reporting it, as being distinct from a description of
the original experience.
Caution should be urged when considering whether it
may be appropriate to recommend that participants control
their dreams, given that doing so increases sleep disturbances
via awakenings (however, see LaBerge et al., 2018a, who
included data from uninterrupted REM sleep only, but see also
LaBerge et al., 2018b, for a paradigm in which participants
remained awake for 30min in the middle of the night,
which increased LD recall), and also that controlling dream
content is unnatural, therefore it may restrict the activation
of memory sources and emotions that may underly sleep-
dependent memory consolidation (Wamsley and Stickgold,
2011) and emotion regulation (Walker, 2009) processes.
Perhaps only in the case of nightmares causing substantive
distress, most typically in sufferers of post-traumatic stress
disorder, should the possible benefits of reducing distress from
terrifying dreams outweigh the likely negative consequences
of changing sleep structure and physiology, by restricting
the opportunity for “offline” processing (e.g., Putois et al.,
2019).
In the occasions of spontaneous ongoing lucidity, whereby
the experience does not awaken the dreamer, either the dreamer
attempts to understand, or even “interpret” meaning from the
typically bizarre dream narrative in which they find themselves,
or they attempt to control it in some form during the dream
state. The latter, in the case of LD, can be learned in some
cases (LaBerge, 1980). Comparable practices during wakefulness
demonstrate the ability for some to being able to gain fuller
awareness of some typically more automatic behaviors, as
depicted by the rise in popularity of mindfulness.
LD is concerning for a number of reasons, as recently outlined
by Vallat and Ruby (2019), whereby training to overcome the
mental content spontaneously emerging during sleep-dependent
cognition ultimately changes and thwarts those processes.
Humans likely need to foster the conditions for those processes to
occur in order to benefit from the plethora of advantages of sleep.
It seems surprising that LD has received much attention,
when time spent dreaming is far greater. Furthermore, the
nature of dreaming and consciousness is fascinating, and may
provide insights into the nature and perhaps function of
underlying cognitive processes. For instance, dream bizarreness,
which typifies REM mentation (Revonsuo and Tarkko, 2002;
Payne, 2010) and likely results, at least in part, from
hyperassociativity of distinct memory sources during sleep
(Horton and Malinowski, 2015) may inform an understanding
of the activation, fragmentation and re-organization of memory
sources as part of sleep-dependent memory consolidation
processes (Horton, 2017). Lucidity, however, is highly atypical
and therefore arguably cannot offer so much insight.
DISCUSSION
“Control” within LD inherently unnatural and disrupts sleep.
Controlled dreams rarely exist spontaneously, either in typical or
atypical cognition. Scholars therefore should have the integrity
to consider the impact that studies of control may have not
only on participants engaging with such studies, but also the
wider community who may be attracted to the idea of controlling
their dreams. There is a duty to convey that we should not
control, control, but instead promote the benefits of sleeping well
(Walker, 2019), to afford the opportunity to dream.
Nevertheless, it is important to consider whether LDmay have
adaptiveness value, especially in the case of emotion processing
and/or when the incidence of LD correlates with pathologies.
LD may also provide insights into the nature of dreaming,
principally by involving the dreamer during the dream (Zink and
Pietrowsky, 2015), rather than just afterwards during recall.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and
has approved it for publication.
REFERENCES
Baird, B., Mota-Rolim, S. A., and Dresler, M. (2019). The cognitive
neuroscience of lucid dreaming. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 100, 305–323.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.03.008
Baylor, G. W., and Cavallero, C. (2001). Memory sources associated with REM
and NREM dream reports throughout the night: a new look at the data. Sleep
24, 165–170.
Blagrove, M., Fouquet, N. C., Henley-Einion, J. A., Pace-Schott, E. F., Davies, A.
C., Neuschaffer, J. L., et al. (2011). Assessing the dream-lag effect for REM and
NREM stage 2 dreams. PLoS ONE 6:e26708. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0026708
Cai, D. J., Mednick, S. A., Harrison, E. M., Kanady, J. C., andMednick, S. C. (2009).
REM, not incubation, improves creativity by priming associative networks.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106, 10130–10134. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0900271106
Horton, C. L. (2017). Consciousness across sleep and wake – continuity
and discontinuity of memory experiences. Front. Psychiatry. 8:159.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2017.00159
Horton, C. L., and Malinowski,. J. E. (2015). Autobiographical memory
and hyperassociativity in the dreaming brain: Implications for
memory consolidation in sleep. Front. Psychol. Psychopath. 6:874.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00874
Johnson, M. K., Kahan, T. L., and Raye, C. L. (1984). Dreams
and reality monitoring. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 113, 329–344.
doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.113.3.329
Kahan, T. L., and LaBerge, S. P. (2011). Dreaming and waking:
similarities and differences revisited. Conscious. Cogn. 20, 494–514.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.002
LaBerge, S. (1980). Lucid dreaming as a learnable skill: a case study. Percept. Mot.
Skills 51, 1039–1042. doi: 10.2466/pms.1980.51.3f.1039
LaBerge, S., Baird, B., and Zimbardo, P. G. (2018a). Smooth tracking of visual
targets distinguishes lucid, R. E. M., sleep dreaming and waking perception
from imagination. Nat. Commun. 9:3298. doi: 10.1038/s41467-018-05547-0
LaBerge, S., LaMarca, K., and Baird, B. (2018b). Pre-sleep treatment with
galantamine stimulates lucid dreaming: A double-blind, placebo-controlled,
crossover study. PLoS ONE. 13:e 0201246. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0201246
Lewis, P. A., Knoblich, G., and Poe, G. (2018). How memory replay in
sleep boosts creative problem-solving. Trends Cogn. Sci. 22, 491–503.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2018.03.009
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 July 2020 | Volume 14 | Article 259
Horton Dream Cognition, Consciousness and Control
Malinowski, J. E., and Horton, C. L. (2015). Metaphor and hyperassociativity: the
imagination mechanisms behind emotional memory assimilation in sleep and
dreams. Front. Psychol. Psychopath. 6:1132. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01132
Mota-Rolim, S. A. (2020). On moving the eyes to flag lucid dreaming. Front.
Neurosci. 14:361. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2020.00361
Neuhäusler, A., Schredl, M., and Göritz, A. S. (2018). General knowledge about
lucid dreaming and lucid dream induction techniques: an online study. Int. J.
Dream Res. 11, 179–185. doi: 10.11588/ijodr.2018.2.50491
Payne, J. D. (2010). “Memory consolidation, the diurnal rhythm of cortisol,
and the nature of dreams: a new hypothesis,” in International Review of
Neurobiology: Dreams and Dreaming, eds A. Clow and P. McNamara (London:
Elsevier), 103–134.
Payne, J. D., and Nadel, L. (2004). Sleep, dreams, and memory consolidation:
the role of the stress hormone cortisol. Learn. Mem. 11, 671–678.
doi: 10.1101/lm.77104
Putois, B., Peter-Derex, L., Leslie, W., Braboszcz, C., El-Hage, W., and Bastuji,
H. (2019). Internet-based intervention for posttraumatic stress disorder: using
remote imagery rehearsal therapy to treat nightmares. Psychother. Psychosom.
88, 315–316. doi: 10.1159/000501105
Revonsuo, A., and Tarkko, K. (2002). Binding in dreams: the bizarreness of dream
images and the unity of consciousness. J. Conscious. Studies 9, 3–24.
Schredl, M., and Erlacher, D. (2004). Lucid dreaming frequency and personality.
Pers. Individ. Dif. 37, 1463–1473. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2004.02.003
Schredl, M., and Hofmann, F. (2003). Continuity between waking
activities and dream activities. Conscious. Cogn. 12, 298–308.
doi: 10.1016/S1053-8100(02)00072-7
Solms, M. (2000). Dreaming and REM sleep are controlled by different brain
mechanisms. Behav. Brain Sci. 23, 843–850. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00003988
Stumbrys, T., Erlacher, D., and Schredl, M. (2016). Effectiveness of
motor practice in lucid dreams: a comparison with physical and
mental practice. J. Sports Sci. 34, 27–34. doi: 10.1080/02640414.2015.
1030342
Vallat, R., Eskinazi, M., Nicolas, A., and Ruby, P. (2018). Sleep and dream habits in
a sample of French college students who report no sleep disorders. J. Sleep Res.
27:e12659. doi: 10.1111/jsr.12659
Vallat, R., and Ruby, P. M. (2019). Is it a good idea to cultivate lucid dreaming?
Front. Psychol. 10:2585. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02585
Voss, U., Holzmann, R., Hobson, J. A., Paulus, W., Koppehele-Gossel, J., Klimke,
A., et al. (2014). Induction of self-awareness in dreams through frontal
low current stimulation of gamma activity. Nat. Neurosci. 17, 810–812.
doi: 10.1038/nn.3719
Walker, M. P. (2009). REM, dreams and emotional brain homeostasis. Front.
Neurosci. 3, 442–443. Available online at: https://walkerlab.berkeley.edu/
reprints/Walker_REM-Emotion_FiN_2010.pdf
Walker, M. P. (2019). A societal sleep prescription. Neuron 103, 559–562.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2019.06.015
Wamsley, E. J. (2014). Dreaming and offline memory consolidation. Curr. Neurol.
Neurosci. Rep. 14:433. doi: 10.1007/s11910-013-0433-5
Wamsley, E. J., and Stickgold, R. (2011). Memory, sleep and dreaming:
experiencing consolidation. Sleep Med. Clin. 6, 97–108.
Zink, N., and Pietrowsky, R. (2015). Theories of dreaming and lucid dreaming: An
integrative review towards sleep, dreaming and consciousness. Int. J. Dream
Res. 8, 35–53. doi: 10.11588/ijodr.2015.1.17811
Conflict of Interest: The author declares that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2020 Horton. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the
copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 July 2020 | Volume 14 | Article 259
